Abstract
Every absolutely stable game has von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set solutions. (Simple games and [n, n−1]-games are included in the class of absolutely stable games.) The character of these solutions suggests that the distributive aspect of purely discriminatory solutions is of as much conceptual importance as the discriminatory aspect.
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Weber, R.J. Distributive solutions for absolutely stable games. Int J Game Theory 11, 53–56 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01771247
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01771247