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Allocating joint costs by means of the nucleolus

Abstract

This paper presents a sufficient condition for the nucleolus to coincide with the SCRB method vector and for nonemptiness of the core. It also studies the reasonableness and the monotonicity of the nucleolus under this condition. Finally it analyses the class of games satisfying the condition and compares it with the classes of convex games, subconvex games and the classQ of Driessen and Tijs.

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Legros, P. Allocating joint costs by means of the nucleolus. Int J Game Theory 15, 109–119 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01770979

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01770979

Keywords

  • Economic Theory
  • Game Theory
  • Method Vector
  • Convex Game
  • Joint Cost