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International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 15, Issue 2, pp 83–99 | Cite as

A dynamic analysis of the repeated prisoner's dilemma game

  • M. C. Blad
Papers

Abstract

A new dynamic model for the repeated prisoner's dilemma game is analyzed.

Keywords

Economic Theory Game Theory Dynamic Analysis Repeated Prisoner 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

  1. Axelrod R (1979) The evolution of cooporation in the prisoner's dilemma. Institute of Public Policy Studies, University of Michigan, discussion paper no 143Google Scholar
  2. Grofman B (1975) The prisoner's dilemma game and the problem of rational choice. Paradox reconsidered in frontiers of economics. University Publications, Blacksburg, VirginiaGoogle Scholar
  3. Hirsch MW, Smale S (1974) Differential equations, dynamical systems, and linear algebra. Academic Press, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  4. Maynard Smith J, Price GR (1973) The logic of animal conflicts. Nature 246Google Scholar
  5. Rosenthal RW (1979) Sequences of games with varying opponents. Econometrica 47/6Google Scholar
  6. Smale S (1980) The prisoner's dilemma and dynamical systems associated to non-cooperative games. Econometrica 48/7Google Scholar
  7. Taylor PD, Jonker LB (1978) Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics. Mathematical Bioscience 40Google Scholar
  8. Zeeman EC (1980) Population dynamics from game theory. Springer Lecture Notes in Mathematics, no 819Google Scholar
  9. Zeeman EC (1981) Dynamics of the evolution of animal conflicts. Journal of Theoretical Biology 89Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • M. C. Blad
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsThe University of SydneyAustralia

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