Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of effectivity functions
An effectivity functionE assigns to every coalitionS of players a familyE (S) of subsetsB of an outcome setA such thatS can force the outcome to belong to any of the setsB inE (S). The effectivity functionE is stable if for every preference profile there is an outcomex with the property that there is no coalitionS and subsetB ofA such thatB εE (S) and each player inS prefers everyy εB tox.
The paper gives a necessary and sufficient condition for an effectivity function to be stable.
KeywordsEconomic Theory Game Theory Effectivity Function Outcome setA Preference Profile
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