International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 14, Issue 2, pp 65–72 | Cite as

Monotonic solutions of cooperative games

  • H. P. Young


The principle of monotonicity for cooperative games states that if a game changes so that some player's contribution to all coalitions increases or stays the same then the player's allocation should not decrease. There is a unique symmetric and efficient solution concept that is monotonic in this most general sense — the Shapley value. Monotonicity thus provides a simple characterization of the value without resorting to the usual “additivity” and “dummy” assumptions, and lends support to the use of the value in applications where the underlying “game” is changing, e.g. in cost allocation problems.


Economic Theory Game Theory Allocation Problem General Sense Efficient Solution 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1985

Authors and Affiliations

  • H. P. Young
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Public AffairsUniversity of MarylandCollege ParkUSA

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