International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 13, Issue 1, pp 1–13 | Cite as

A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games

  • E. van Damme
Article

Abstract

The concept of quasi-perfect equilibria for games in extensive form is introduced. It is shown that a proper equilibrium of a normal form game induces a quasi-perfect equilibrium in every extensive form game having this normal form.

Keywords

Normal Form Economic Theory Game Theory Extensive Form Form Game 

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References

  1. Damme, E.E.C. van: Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept. Ph. D. thesis Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven 1983.Google Scholar
  2. Kreps, D.M., andR. Wilson: Sequential equilibria. Econometrica50, 1982, 863–894.Google Scholar
  3. Kuhn, H.W.: Extensive games and the problem of information. Annals of Mathematics Studies28, 1953, 193–216.Google Scholar
  4. Myerson, R.B.: Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept. Int. J. Game Theory7, 1978, 73–80.Google Scholar
  5. Selten, R.: Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games. Int. J. Game Theory4, 1975, 25–55.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1984

Authors and Affiliations

  • E. van Damme
    • 1
  1. 1.Dept. of Mathematics and Computing ScienceUniversity of TechnologyDelftThe Netherlands

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