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International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 13, Issue 4, pp 193–200 | Cite as

Bargaining conventions

  • K. G. Binmore
Papers

Abstract

This paper describes and defends a weaker version of Nash's axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives which is called convention consistency.

Keywords

Economic Theory Game Theory Weak Version Irrelevant Alternative Bargaining Convention 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

  1. Binmore, K.G.: Nash bargaining theory I. ICERD discussion paper 80/09, 1980.Google Scholar
  2. Harsanyi, J.C.: Rational behaviour and bargaining equilibrium in games and social situations. Cambridge 1977.Google Scholar
  3. Nash, J.F.: Non-cooperative games. Annals of Mathematics54, 1951a, 286–295.Google Scholar
  4. —: The bargaining problem. Annals of Mathematics54, 1951b, 286–295.Google Scholar
  5. —: Two-person cooperative games. Econometrica21, 1953. 128–140.Google Scholar
  6. Roth, A.E.: Axiomatic models of bargaining. Lecture notes in economics and related disciplines No. 170. Berlin-Heidelberg-New York-Tokyo 1979.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1984

Authors and Affiliations

  • K. G. Binmore
    • 1
  1. 1.London School of EconomicsLondon WC2Great Britain

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