Replication invariance of bargaining solutions
This note is concerned with the behavior of bargaining solutions under replication of bargaining problems. A notion of replication, alternative to that studied by Kalai, is proposed, and it is shown that for both the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, the sum of what the agents of each type obtain in the replicated problem is equal to what the agent they are representing would obtain in the original problem under an application of the asymmetric generalization of the solution with weights proportional to the orders of replication of the different types. This similarity in behavior of the two solutions is in contrast with the conclusions reached by Kalai.
KeywordsEconomic Theory Game Theory Original Problem Bargaining Solution Bargaining Problem
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