Abstract
We consider stability of Selten's perfect equilibrium point against slight imperfections of rationality of players. As its stability is not sufficient, we strengthen the perfectness concept and define astrictly perfect equilibrium point. We provide sufficient conditions for this equilibrium point.
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The author wishes to thank Professor Mitsuo Suzuki of Tokyo Institute of Technology and Dr. Mamoru Kaneko of University of Tsukuba for very helpful discussions and suggestions.
The author is grateful to the referee for useful comments.
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Okada, A. On stability of perfect equilibrium points. Int J Game Theory 10, 67–73 (1981). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01769260
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01769260