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International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 4, Issue 1, pp 1–5 | Cite as

A note on the L-P formulation of zero-sum sequential games with incomplete information

  • J. -P. Ponssard
Papers

Abstract

Zero-sum games with incomplete information are formulated as linear programs in which the players' behavioral strategies appear as primal and dual variables. Known properties for these games may then be derived from duality theory.

Keywords

Economic Theory Game Theory Incomplete Information Duality Theory Behavioral Strategy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

  1. Dantzig, G. B.: A Proof of the Equivalence of the Programming Problem and the Game Problem in: Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation, Koopmans, T. C. ed., Cowles Commission Monograph 13, Wiley, 1951.Google Scholar
  2. Ponssard, J. P., and S.Zamir: Zero Sum Sequential Games with Incomplete Information, Int. J. of Game Theory 2, No. 2, 1973.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© PHYSICA-VERLAG Rudolf Liebing KG 1975

Authors and Affiliations

  • J. -P. Ponssard
    • 1
  1. 1.IIASALaxenburgAustria

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