A note on the L-P formulation of zero-sum sequential games with incomplete information
Zero-sum games with incomplete information are formulated as linear programs in which the players' behavioral strategies appear as primal and dual variables. Known properties for these games may then be derived from duality theory.
KeywordsEconomic Theory Game Theory Incomplete Information Duality Theory Behavioral Strategy
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