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Bimatrix games with unique equilibrium points

Abstract

A necessary and sufficient condition is found for a given pair of strategies to be the unique equilibrium point of some bimatrix game.

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References

  • Gale, D., andS. Sherman: Solutions of finite two-person games, Contributions to the theory of games1, Princeton, 37–49, 1950.

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  • Millham, C. B.: Constructing bimatrix games with special properties. Nav. Res. Log. Quart.19, No 4, 709–714, 1973.

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Kreps, V.L. Bimatrix games with unique equilibrium points. Int J Game Theory 3, 115–118 (1974). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01766397

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01766397

Keywords

  • Equilibrium Point
  • Economic Theory
  • Game Theory
  • Unique Equilibrium
  • Unique Equilibrium Point