International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 3, Issue 3, pp 129–140 | Cite as

The nucleolus in games with major and minor players

  • Z. Galil
Papers

Abstract

In this paper, we considern-person weighted majority games with major and minor players. We prove under certain conditions that if the minor players split into equal “mini-minor” players the nucleolus' components which correspond to the major players do not change.

Keywords

Economic Theory Game Theory Major Player Weighted Majority Majority Game 

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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1974

Authors and Affiliations

  • Z. Galil
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer Science, Upson HallCornell UniversityIthaca

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