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International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 19, Issue 2, pp 139–152 | Cite as

Comparative cooperative game theory

  • T. Ichiishi
Article

Abstract

Given two side-payment gamesv andw, both defined for the same finite player-setN, the following three welfare criteria are characterized in terms of the datav andw: (A) For everyy ∃ C(w) there existsx ∃ C(v) such thaty≤x; (A′) For everyx∃C(v) there existsyεC(w) such thaty≤x; and (B) There existyεC(w) andxεC(v) such thaty≤x. (HereC(v) denotes the core ofv.) Given two non-side-payment gamesv andw, sufficient conditions for the criteria (A′) and (B) are established, by observing that an ordinal convex game has a large core.

Keywords

Economic Theory Game Theory Cooperative Game Large Core Cooperative Game Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • T. Ichiishi
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsThe Ohio State UniversityColumbusUSA

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