Abstract
Necessary and sufficient conditions are obtained for the existence of an equilibrium point (as well as for the existence of a dominating equilibrium point) in a two-person non-zerosum game of timing.
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The first version of this paper was written in September 1979 while the author was a Ph.D. student at the University of Toronto and was revised in January 1981. This research was supported by a Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council Canada Scholarship. The author is very grateful to Anatol Rapoport and Marc Kilgour for encouragement, suggestions and support, to Martin Osborne and two referees for constructive criticisms and suggestions and to both the Institute for Advanced Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University for providing a stimulating working atmosphere. This research was also partially supported by the Office of Naval Research, Contract Number N00014-77-C-0518.
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Pitchik, C. Equilibria of a two-person non-zerosum noisy game of timing. Int J Game Theory 10, 207–221 (1981). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01755965
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01755965