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International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 19, Issue 3, pp 301–324 | Cite as

A local theory of cooperative games

Article

Abstracts

In many game-type situations, a global normal form game,u=U(π), is not known, but the matrix of partial derivaties ofU(π), denote it by ∇U(π0), can be observed. To facilitate the analysis of such situations, this study builds a local theory on linear systemdu=∇(π0), which I call a local form game. I introduce core-like local solutions in order to explain the formation of an institution sustainable from a local theoretic viewpoint. I apply my method to the three-country transfer game and characterize locally sustainable transfer agreements in terms of conditions on the underlying economy.

Keywords

Normal Form Economic Theory Game Theory Local Solution Cooperative Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • M. Yano
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of EconomicsYokohama National UniversityYokohamaJapan

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