Abstract
In this paper, we investigate a scheme for approximating a two-person zero-sum gameG of incomplete information by means of a natural systemG mn of its finite subgames. The main question is: For largem andn, is an optimal strategy forG mn necessarily anε-optimal strategy forG?
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Mamer, J.W., Schilling, K.E. Finite approximations to a zero-sum game with incomplete information. Int J Game Theory 19, 101–106 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753710
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753710