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International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 19, Issue 1, pp 45–57 | Cite as

Monotonicity of the core and value in dynamic cooperative games

  • E. C. Rosenthal
Article

Abstract

We examine behavior of the core and value of certain classes of cooperative games in which a dynamic aspect is introduced. New players are added to the games while the underlying structure is held constant. This is done by considering games that satisfy properties like convexity, or games that are derived from optimization problems in which a player's addition can be defined naturally. For such games we give conditions regarding monotonicity of the core and value.

Key Words

Cooperative games core Shapley value monotonicity 

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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • E. C. Rosenthal
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Management Science and Operations Management, School of Business and ManagementTemple UniversityPhiladelphiaUSA

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