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The propensity to disrupt and the disruption nucleolus of a characteristic function game

Abstract

Gately [1974] recently introduced the concept of an individual player's “propensity to disrupt” a payoff vector in a three-person characteristic function game. As a generalisation of this concept we propose the “disruption nucleolus” of ann-person game. The properties and computational possibilities of this concept are analogous to those of the nucleolus itself. Two numerical examples are given.

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References

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Littlechild, S.C., Vaidya, K.G. The propensity to disrupt and the disruption nucleolus of a characteristic function game. Int J Game Theory 5, 151–161 (1976). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753316

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Keywords

  • Characteristic Function
  • Economic Theory
  • Game Theory
  • Payoff Vector
  • Individual Player