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Representations of simple games by social choice functions

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Abstract

We investigate possible constructions of choice procedures (social choice functions) for committees (simple games). The notion of a capacity of a committee is derived from our construction. We determine the capacity of strong, symmetric and weak simple games. We also provide an upper bound on the capacity of a simple game without veto players.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Mathematics, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel

    B. Peleg

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  1. B. Peleg
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Peleg, B. Representations of simple games by social choice functions. Int J Game Theory 7, 81–94 (1978). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753237

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753237

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