A characterization of polyhedral market games
The class of games without side payments obtainable from markets having finitely many commodities and continuous concave utility functions is considered. It is first shown that each of these so-called market games is totally balanced, for a reasonable generalization of the idea of a balanced side payment game. It is then shown that among polyhedral games (i.e., games for which each (V(S) is a polyhedron), this property characterizes the market games.
KeywordsUtility Function Economic Theory Game Theory Side Payment Market Game
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