The future of conventional arms control

Abstract

Dramatic changes in conventional military capabilities coupled with nuclear parity should greatly increase the importance of conventional military power as well as raise new opportunities and problems for arms control. Those changes are not yet widely appreciated and in fact, there is a lack of analytic tools by which to appraise their implications and importance.

As an initial step to systematic analysis of the desirability and feasibility of conventional arms control agreements, this paper describes current trends in weapons development and evaluates alternative interpretations of the implications of those trends. The requirements of effective and reliable arms control agreements are then enumerated and a general assessment made of the difficulties in meeting those requirements.

The conclusions reached are necessarily speculative in light of the limited data and the surprisingly sparse analysis available on the characteristics, combat effectiveness and complementary combat and supporting requirements of new conventional weaponry. However, available evidence suggests the imminent emergence of significantly greater incentives for larger conventional forces, for larger logistics and support bases, for surprise attack, and for campaign strategies that emphasize speed and high attrition on all sides. If true, these factors will increase pressures for larger military budgets while also increasing instabilities in arms competitions. They also should increase interest in arms control measures though the characteristics of new weapons technology may make designing such measures even more difficult than in the past.