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Multipart pricing of public goods

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References

  1. For a discussion of police and exchange costs in relation to the public goods problem, see Harold Demsetz, “The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights”, Journ. Law and Econ. 7 (Oct. 1964), 11 - 26.

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  2. This is the well - known Samuelson dilemma. See Paul Samuelson, “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure”,RE Stat 36 (November, 1954).

  3. The marginal benefit taxation approach is described concisely in R. A. Musgrave,The Theory of Public Finance. New York: McGraw Hill, 1959.

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  4. The manner in which the participants might, in the absence of strategic behavior, arrive at a Pareto optimal solution has been described in J. M. Buchanan,Demand and Supply of Public Goods. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968.

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Clarke, E.H. Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice 11, 17–33 (1971). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01726210

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01726210

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