Public Choice

, Volume 26, Issue 1, pp 59–74 | Cite as

A diagrammatic exposition of the logic of collection action

  • John R. Chamberlin


Public Finance Collection Action 
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  1. Chamberlin, John. “Provision of Collective Goods as a Function of Group Size,”American Political Science Review, 68 (June, 1974), 707–716.Google Scholar
  2. Head, John.Public Goods and Public Welfare. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1974.Google Scholar
  3. McGuire, Martin. “Group Size, Group Homogeneity and Aggregate Provision of a Pure Public Good under Cournot Behavior,”Public Choice, 18 (Summer, 1974), 107–126.Google Scholar
  4. Musgrave, Richard.The Theory of Public Finance. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959.Google Scholar
  5. Olson, Mancur, Jr.The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965.Google Scholar
  6. —— and Zeckhauser, Richard. “An Economic Theory of Alliances,”Review of Economics and Statistics, 48 (August, 1966), 266–279.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 1974

Authors and Affiliations

  • John R. Chamberlin
    • 1
  1. 1.The Institute of Public Policy StudiesThe University of MichiganUSA

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