Public Choice

, Volume 26, Issue 1, pp 1–18 | Cite as

Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles

  • William V. Gehrlein
  • Peter C. Fishburn


Public Finance Preference Profile Anonymous Preference 


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Copyright information

© Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 1974

Authors and Affiliations

  • William V. Gehrlein
  • Peter C. Fishburn
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Management Science and Organizational Behavior, College of Business AdministrationThe Pennsylvania State UniversityUSA

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