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Public Choice

, Volume 22, Issue 1, pp 91–102 | Cite as

Inessential games and non-imposed solutions to allocation problems

  • Charles Bird
Articles
  • 45 Downloads

Conclusions

The basic objective of this paper has been to develop some mathematical models for shortage situations (both real and psychological) in which the solution is determined by the participants. The purpose of these models is to highlight some of the inequities which may result when such bargaining goes on and to observe that under certain conditions the structure of the game is such that each player may be able to salvage at least a partial allocation. This can occur when the game is not status quo stable for power weighted solutions, or when priorities are equal for priority solutions. Majority solutions can counteract powerful groups and can minimize the number of unsatiated parties. But some majority solutions can also be unfair by discriminating against the remaining players. These models may be of some use in determining whether or not outside regulation of a particular situation is a sound policy.

Keywords

Mathematical Model Public Finance Allocation Problem Basic Objective Powerful Group 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Bibliography

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Copyright information

© Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 1974

Authors and Affiliations

  • Charles Bird
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Pure and Applied Math.Washington State UniversityUSA

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