Public Choice

, Volume 30, Issue 1, pp 23–28 | Cite as

“Social preference” and game theory: A comment on “the dilemma of a paretian liberal”

  • Nicholas R. Miller
Articles

Keywords

Game Theory Public Finance Social Preference 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Bernholz, Peter. “Is a Paretian Liberal Really Impossible?”Public Choice, 20 (Winter 1974).Google Scholar
  2. --. “Liberalism, Logrolling, and Cyclical Group Preferences.”Kyklos, 29 (1976).Google Scholar
  3. Bloomfield, Stefan D. “A Social Choice Interpretation of the von Neumann-Morgenstern Game.”Econometrica, 44 (January 1976).Google Scholar
  4. Farquharson, Robin.Theory of Voting. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969.Google Scholar
  5. Gibbard, Allan. “A Pareto-Consistent Liberatarian Claim.”Journal of Economic Theory, 7 (1974).Google Scholar
  6. Kelly, Jerry S. “Rights Exercising and a Pareto-Consistent Libertarian Claim.”Journal of Economic Theory, 13 (1976).Google Scholar
  7. Luce, R. Duncan, and Howard Raiffa.Games and Decisions. New York: Wiley, 1957.Google Scholar
  8. Mayhew, David R.Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974.Google Scholar
  9. Plott, Charles R. “Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpretation.”American Journal of Political Science, 20 (August 1976).Google Scholar
  10. Sen, Amartya K. “The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal.”Journal of Political Economy, 78 (January–February 1970).Google Scholar
  11. Wilson, Robert B. “The Game-Theoretic Structure of Arrow's General Possibility Theorem.”Journal of Economic Theory, 5 (1972).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 1977

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nicholas R. Miller
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of MarylandBaltimore

Personalised recommendations