Public Choice

, Volume 30, Issue 1, pp 23–28 | Cite as

“Social preference” and game theory: A comment on “the dilemma of a paretian liberal”

  • Nicholas R. Miller


Game Theory Public Finance Social Preference 


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Copyright information

© Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 1977

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nicholas R. Miller
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of MarylandBaltimore

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