This paper has argued that changing technology has increased opportunities for voter participation in the legislative process and has presented a proposal which takes some advantage of such possibilities. The objective has not been so much to criticize our present legislative voting arrangement, but to suggest for the future an alternative that might prove superior.
The New Left balks at the “establishment”, and conservatives look with dismay upon the “liberal clique”. Direct participation largely would solve these problems, by-passing intermediaries and allowing direct voter or voter-proxy approval of all legislation. If we accept the principal that, with constitutional guarantees, qualified individuals should determine as democratically and as directly as possible the decisions that affect their personal and corporate welfare, then the future holds opportunities for greater efficiency in collective action.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.
Buy single article
Instant access to the full article PDF.
Price includes VAT for USA
Subscribe to journal
Immediate online access to all issues from 2019. Subscription will auto renew annually.
This is the net price. Taxes to be calculated in checkout.
The author is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Georgia State College. He wishes to acknowledge helpful comments from James M. Buchanan, Roger Sherman, Gordon Tullock, and Thomas D. Willett on an earlier version of this piece. Responsibility for errors and opinions remains, of course, with the author.
About this article
Cite this article
Miller, J.C. A program for direct and proxy voting in the legislative process. Public Choice 7, 107–113 (1969). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01718736
- Public Finance
- Collective Action
- Great Efficiency
- Qualified Individual
- Direct Participation