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On the power and importance of the mean preference in a mathematical model of democratic choice

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Authors
  1. Otto A. Davis
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  2. Melvin J. Hinich
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Additional information

This research was supported by grants from Resources for the Future and the National Science Foundation. Appreciation is also due the Ford Foundation for providing one of the authors with a Faculty Reasearch Fellowship.

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Davis, O.A., Hinich, M.J. On the power and importance of the mean preference in a mathematical model of democratic choice. Public Choice 5, 59–72 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01718684

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