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The author, an assistant professor at California Institute of Technology, wishes to express his appreciation to Joe Oppenheimer and Norman Frohlich for their helpful advice and encouragement during work on early drafts of this paper, and to William Niskanen for his thoughtful critique and suggestions.
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Miller, G.J. Bureaucratic compliance as a game on the unit square. Public Choice 29, 37–51 (1977). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01718561
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