Public Choice

, Volume 18, Issue 1, pp 1–23 | Cite as

Game-theoretic models of bloc-voting under proportional representation

Really sophisticated voting in french labor elections
  • Howard Rosenthal


Public Finance Proportional Representation 
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  1. 1.
    Jacques Fremontier,La Fortresse Ouvriere: Renault, Paris, 1971, pp. 303–304. Fremontier's observation about Renault has been confirmed for other organizations by observers of a variety of political persuasions. In particular, I owe much to a conversation with Rene Moriaux, labor union specialist at the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. Gerald Kramer pointed out important errors in the original manuscript. James Laing, Peter Ordeshook and Melvin Hinich are to be thanked for comments. Any weaknesses of this paper, however, are the sole responsibility of the author.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    See William Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, Positive Political Theory, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1973.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    See, for example, R. Ducan Luce and Howard Raiffa,Games and Decisions New York, Wiley, 1957, pp. 170–173.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Luce and Raiffa, p. 106.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Melvin Hinich, John O. Ledyard, and Peter C. Ordershook, “Electoral Equilibrium and Majority Rule,”Journal of Economic Theory, 1972; and “A Theory of Electoral Equilibrium: A Spatial Analysis Based on the Theory of Games,”Journal of Politics, 1972.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Jack Sawyer and Ducan MacRae, Jr., “Game Theory and Cumulative Voting in Illinois, 1902–1954,”American Political Science Review, 1962.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Melvin Hinich and Peter C. Ordeshook, “The Electoral College: A Spatial Analysis,”Political Methodology, forthcoming; Alvin K. Klevorick and Gerald H. Kramer, “Social Choice on Pollution Management: The Genossenschaften,”Journal of Public Economics, 2 (1073), 101–146.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Kenneth Arrow,Social Choice and Individual Values, Cowles Commission Monograph No. 12, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1951.Google Scholar
  9. 12.
    Letters to the editor by Gerald Kramer and Thomas Casstevens,American Political Science Review, (1968), 955–956 and (1971), 187–189.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 1974

Authors and Affiliations

  • Howard Rosenthal
    • 1
  1. 1.Carnegie-Mellon UniversityUSA

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