Conclusions
The analysis of a city of equals, while admittedly removed from the real world, does yield an important finding: in spite of the presence of increasing returns to scale, the optimal city size is finite. Moreover, the application of the theoretical developments of the theory of clubs to the concept of the co-operative city and to coalitions within the city seems difficult but possible. It may provide valuable insights into programs of public acquisition of urban land and the creation of New Towns, and into the analysis of the urban political process, respectively. Also, I might conjecture that, with this transfer, there is considerable scope for further development of the areas of inter and intra-urban migrations, and of a general theory of urban growth and decay.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Arrow, Kenneth J., “Political and Economic Evaluation of Social Effects and Externalities” inFrontiers of Quantitative Economics, ed., M. J. Intriligator, North Holland, 1971, pp. 3–25.
Buchanan, James M., “An Economic Theory of Clubs,”Economica, 1965, pp. 1–14.
McGuire, Martin, “Private Good Clubs and Public Good Clubs: Economic Models of Group Formation,”The Swedish Journal of Economics, 1971, pp. 84–99.
Pauly, Mark V., “Clubs, Commonality and the Core,”Economica, 1967, pp. 314–324.
Pauly, Mark V., “Cores and Clubs,”Public Choice, Fall 1970, pp. 53–65.
Samuelson, Paul, “Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,”Review of Economics and Statistics, 1954, pp. 387–389.
Tiebout, Charles, “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,”Journal of Political Economy, 1956, pp. 416–424.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Fisch, O. Optimal city size, the economic theory of clubs and exclusionary zoning. Public Choice 24, 59–70 (1975). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01718416
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01718416