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Models for the optimal allocation of funds over N constituencies during an election campaign

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Conclusion

The aim of this paper has been to give some insight into viable methods for the optimal distribution of a political party's monetary resources. It is, of course, naive to believe that this factor should be the only one considered in developing an optimal allocation strategy. However, in many cases the most critical factor determining who wins a particular constituency is the amount of money spent by the opposing parties in the constituency. In lieu of this, the models developed here have related to the allocation of campaign funds under assumptions in which the major factor governing allocation is competitive expenditures.

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Authors
  1. W. D. Cook
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  2. M. J. L. Kirby
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  3. S. L. Mehndiratta
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Additional information

Professor Cook is at York University, Professors Kirby and Mehndiratta are at Dalhousie University.

The research on this paper was supported in part under D.R.B. Grant # 1200-292-001 and N.R.C. Grant # 1200-249-004.

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Cook, W.D., Kirby, M.J.L. & Mehndiratta, S.L. Models for the optimal allocation of funds over N constituencies during an election campaign. Public Choice 20, 1–16 (1974). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01718174

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