Abstract
The discussion will center mainly on some work on two solution concepts: the core for gaines without side payments and the nucleolus for games with side payments (characteristic funtion games). The core has become an important equilibrium concept in mathematical economics. The nucleolus is related to the theory of bargaining sets.
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This work was supported by the National Science Foundation under grant GK-4795.
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Billera, L.J. Some recent results inn-person game theory. Mathematical Programming 1, 58–67 (1971). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01584072
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01584072