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Interjurisdictional commuting and local public goods

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Abstract

This paper deals with the provision and finance of local public goods, where free riding across communities emanates from interjurisdictional commuting. In a two-city model with inter-city commuting incorporated, the relationship between a market equilibrium and an optimizing solution is investigated. Instruments for achieving Pareto-efficient locations, production and commuting are proposed.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Research Center for Applied Information Sciences, Tohoku University, Katahira 2, 980, Sendai, Japan

    Komei Sasaki

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  1. Komei Sasaki
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Sasaki, K. Interjurisdictional commuting and local public goods. Ann Reg Sci 25, 271–285 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01581853

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01581853

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