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Conditional obligation, deontic paradoxes, and the logic of agency

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Abstract

A variant of Belnap's stit-semantics due to Horty and von Kutschera is used to develop a semantics of obligation. A partial completeness result is stated. The semantics is then used to discuss conditional obligation as well as two paradoxes of deontic logic. The paper argues for the importance of an analysis of agency for deontic logic.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, 15260, Pittsburgh, PA, USA

    Paul Bartha

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  1. Paul Bartha
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Bartha, P. Conditional obligation, deontic paradoxes, and the logic of agency. Ann Math Artif Intell 9, 1–23 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01531259

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