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Lexicographic egalitarian solution and uncertainty in the disagreement point

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Abstract

We analyze bargaining situations in which the feasible set is known but the disagreement point is uncertain. By requiring that all agents, generally, be affected by the uncertainty in the same way, we characterize thelexicographic egalitarian solution.

Zusammenfassung

Wir analysieren Verhandlungssituationen, in denen die Menge der erreichbaren Auszahlungen bekannt, der Drohpunkt jedoch unsicher ist. Durch die Forderung, daß, allgemein gesprochen, alle Spieler (Agenten) in derselben Weise von der vorherrschenden Unsicherheit betroffen sind, charakterisieren wird dielexikographisch egalitäre Lösung.

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Discussions with Professors William Thomson and Hans Peters are gratefully acknowledged. However, I have full responsibility for any shortcomings.

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Chun, Y. Lexicographic egalitarian solution and uncertainty in the disagreement point. ZOR - Methods and Models of Operations Research 33, 259–266 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01423335

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01423335

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