Abstract
Global supervenience of beliefs about physical states of affairs on such states has strongly counter-intuitive consequences about what beliefs we can nomologically hold. This is an argument against a global supervenience of all mental properties on physical ones, and, since that is implied by strong supervenience, also against that as the preferred materialist thesis.
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Kutschera, F.v. Global supervenience and belief. J Philos Logic 23, 103–110 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01417960
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01417960