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Group Decision and Negotiation

, Volume 4, Issue 1, pp 27–37 | Cite as

Credibility of linear equilibrium strategies in a discrete time fishery management game

  • Harri Ehtamo
  • Raimo P. Hämäläinen
Article

Abstract

In this article we consider a two-country dynamic game model of whaling in discrete time. We assume that the countries have exact information, with one-period time delay, about each other's whaling efforts as measured by the number of vessels involved in whaling. It is shown how strategies that linearly depend on the whaling effort of the other country can be used to support a given Pareto-optimal agreement so that there will not be a temptation for unilateral deviation from the agreed decision. The credibility of these cooperative equilibrum strategies is discussed.

Key Words

discrete time dynamic games fishery management games Pareto-optimal efforts linear equilibrium strategies credibility of strategies 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Harri Ehtamo
    • 1
  • Raimo P. Hämäläinen
    • 2
  1. 1.Systems Analysis LaboratoryHelsinki University of TechnologyEspooFinland
  2. 2.Systems Analysis LaboratoryHelsinki University of TechnologyEspooFinland

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