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Optimal coalition size when making proposals is costly

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Abstract

Though some costs of proposing legislation are borne by individual congressmen, the benefits accrue to many. To encourage legislators to incur these costs, members may wish to form coalitions which are larger than a minimum majority, and they may want to allow the proposer of a policy to incorporate private benefits into his proposal.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of California, 92717, Irvine, CA, USA

    Amihai Glazer

  2. Office of Economic Analysis, United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 20549, Washington, DC, USA

    Henry McMillan

Authors
  1. Amihai Glazer
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  2. Henry McMillan
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Additional information

We gratefully acknowledge the comments of anonymous referees, N. Baigent, A. DeVany, B. Grofman, and N. Stoughton. We are solely responsible for any remaining errors. The Securities and Exchange Commision, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or the authors' colleagues on the Staff of the Commission.

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Glazer, A., McMillan, H. Optimal coalition size when making proposals is costly. Soc Choice Welfare 7, 369–380 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01376284

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01376284

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