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Seeing through CORNEA

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Notes

  1. In “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of ‘Appearance,’”International Journal for the Philosophy Religion 16 (1984): 73–93. Parenthetical page references are to this article. Wykstra's primary target is William Rowe's version of the evidential argument from evil as found in Rowe's now classic essay, “The Problem of Evil and Varieties of Atheism,”American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979): 335–341.

  2. See Essays 4 and 5 in William Alston's fine collection,Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell Press, 1989). See also the section entitled “Chisholmian Internalism” in Alvin Plantinga's “Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function,”Philosophical Perspectives 2 (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1988), ed. James E. Tomberlin.

  3. This is not to say thatno accessibility constraint is relevant to matters of epistemic justification. It is arguable that wholly different aspects of what we have to go on must be accessible to us. See Essays 8 and 9 of Alston'sEpistemic Justification, Paul Moser'sEmpirical Justification (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985), chapter V, and Carl Ginet'sKnowledge, Perception and Memory (Dordrecht: Reidel 1975), chapter III.

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  4. The example is, for the most part, lifted out of context from Fred Dretske'sKnowledge and the Flow of Information (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981), p. 130.

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  5. (Cambridge: Harvard Press, 1986), p. 45. I refer the reader to this work for a defense of The Relevant Alternatives View. Also see Dretske's book in note 10.

  6. “The Persistent Problem of Evil,”Faith and Philosophy (April 1988).

  7. Alston, “The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition,” forthcoming inPhilosophical Perspectives 5 (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1991), ed. James E. Tomberlin; Plantinga, “Epistemic Probability and Evil,”Archivio Di filosofia LVI (1988).

  8. Richard Swinburne makes a similar point in “Does Theism Need a Theodicy?,”Canadian Journal of Philosophy (June 1988).

  9. In this connection, see Thomas F. Tracy's excellent discussion of this view, “Victimization and the Problem of Evil: A Response to Ivan Karamozov,” forthcoming inFaith and Philosophy.

  10. For a recent development of Pascal's line of thought, see Tom Morris' “The Hidden God,”Philosophical Topics (1988). John Hick's discussion is in Chapter 8 ofFaith and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell Press, 1957).

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University, 541 Hall of Languages, 13244-170, Syracuse, NY, USA

    Daniel Howard-Snyder

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For useful comments on an early draft of this paper, I wish to thank Andrew Cortens, William Hasker, Richard Swinburne and Mark Webb. I am especially grateful to William Alston, Frances Howard-Snyder and John O'Leary-Hawthorne for extended discussion on several pertinent matters.

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Howard-Snyder, D. Seeing through CORNEA. Int J Philos Relig 32, 25–49 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01313558

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