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Entry restrictions and expenditure effects in the local government market

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Abstract

Recent statutory developments in U.S. local government law have placed more comprehensive administrative procedures and constraints upon those individuals wishing to alter their form of local government. What effect, if any, have these “reforms” had upon the performance of local government; has government become more efficient in providing goods as one body of literature seems to suggest, or has local government become more monopolistic as a result of reduced competition as other strands of thought suggest? By examining the budgetary behavior of local governments under alternative institutional structures, this paper examines these alternative perspectives. The empirical evidence suggests that entry barriers significantly alter the performance of local governments and allow existing units of government to cartelize the market.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Nebraska-Lincoln, USA

    Dolores Tremewan Martin

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  1. Dolores Tremewan Martin
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Additional information

The author is indebted to Richard E. Wagner, Richard B. McKenzie, and to Dale G. Bails for programming assistance with the empirical work.

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Martin, D.T. Entry restrictions and expenditure effects in the local government market. Ann Reg Sci 14, 12–22 (1980). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01284200

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01284200

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