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Imperfect information, monitoring cost and incentives in the agency problem

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Author notes

  1. Pak-Wai Liu

    Present address: Department of Economics, United College, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin N. T., Hong Kong

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    1. Pak-Wai Liu
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    Additional information

    This paper was written when the author was a visiting scholar at the Harvard-Yenching Institute, Harvard University. Valuable comments from an anonymous referee are acknowledged.

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    Liu, PW. Imperfect information, monitoring cost and incentives in the agency problem. Zeitschr. f. Nationalökonomie 42, 235–245 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01282908

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