International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 26, Issue 3, pp 409–417 | Cite as

Rotations: Matching schemes that efficiently preserve the best reply structure of a one shot game

  • Ulrich Kamecke
Note

Abstract

Suppose that we have a two player game in which we want to test experimentally whether the subjects learn to play the game theoretic solution. For this purpose we need a matching scheme which assures that a rational subject behaves in each round of the experiment as if he played a separate stage game. In this paper we show that such a ‘best-reply-structure-preserving matching scheme’ has to be free of repercussion effects, and that the rotation of two equally sized groups of subjects, which was introduced by Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross, solves the problem efficiently.

Keywords

Best Reply Structure Repeated Games Experimental Design Matching 

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References

  1. Cooper R, DeJong DV, Forsythe R, Ross TW (1995) Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games, Mimeo, Boston UniversityGoogle Scholar
  2. Davis DD, Holt CA (1993) Experimental economics. PrincetonGoogle Scholar
  3. Kandori M (1992) Social norms and community enforcement. Review of Economic Studies 59:61–80Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ulrich Kamecke
    • 1
  1. 1.Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Lehrstuhl WirtschaftspolitikBerlinGermany

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