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International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 26, Issue 3, pp 335–351 | Cite as

Ternary voting games

  • Dan S. Felsenthal
  • Moshé Machover
Article

Abstract

We defineternary voting games (TVGs), a generalization ofsimple voting games (SVGs). In a play of an SVG each voter has just two options: voting ‘yes’ or ‘no’. In a TVG a third option is added: abstention. Every SVG can be regarded as a (somewhat degenerate) TVG; but the converse is false. We define appropriate generalizations of the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices for TVGs. We define also theresponsiveness (ordegree of democratic participation) of a TVG and determine, for eachn, the most responsive TVGs withn voters. We show that these maximally responsive TVGs are more responsive than the corresponding SVGs.

Keywords

Economic Theory Game Theory Vote Game Democratic Participation Banzhaf Index 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dan S. Felsenthal
    • 1
  • Moshé Machover
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of HaifaHaifaIsrael
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyKing's College LondonStrandUK

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