Abstract
We analyze the problem of extending a given bilateral principle of justice to a consistentn-creditor bankruptcy rule. Based on the bilateral principle, we build a family of binary relations on the set of creditors in order to make bilateral comparisons between them. We find that the possibility of extending a specific bilateral principle of justice in a consistent way is closely related to the quasi-transitivity of the binary relations mentioned above.
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We would like to thank Bhaskar Dutta, Vincent Feltkamp, Yoram Halevy, Sergiu Hart, Sjaak Hurkens, Ko-Ichi Tadenuma, Eyal Winter and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments.
The main part of this paper was written when this author was at CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg.
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Dagan, N., Volij, O. Bilateral comparisons and consistent fair division rules in the context of bankruptcy problems. Int J Game Theory 26, 11–25 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01262509
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01262509