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Bilateral comparisons and consistent fair division rules in the context of bankruptcy problems

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Abstract

We analyze the problem of extending a given bilateral principle of justice to a consistentn-creditor bankruptcy rule. Based on the bilateral principle, we build a family of binary relations on the set of creditors in order to make bilateral comparisons between them. We find that the possibility of extending a specific bilateral principle of justice in a consistent way is closely related to the quasi-transitivity of the binary relations mentioned above.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mount Scopus, 91905, Jerusalem, Israel

    Nir Dagan

  2. Department of Economics, Brown University, Box B, 02912, Providence, Rhode Island, USA

    Oscar Volij

Authors
  1. Nir Dagan
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  2. Oscar Volij
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Additional information

We would like to thank Bhaskar Dutta, Vincent Feltkamp, Yoram Halevy, Sergiu Hart, Sjaak Hurkens, Ko-Ichi Tadenuma, Eyal Winter and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments.

The main part of this paper was written when this author was at CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg.

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Dagan, N., Volij, O. Bilateral comparisons and consistent fair division rules in the context of bankruptcy problems. Int J Game Theory 26, 11–25 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01262509

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01262509

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