Abstract
This paper analyses auctions in which the valuation of each player not only depends on whether he wins or not, but also on who is the winner if it is not him.
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References
Funk P (1990) The persistence of monopoly and the direction of technological change. Mimeo University of Bonn
Jehiel P, Moldovanu B (1992) On the art of saying “No”. Mimeo University of Bonn
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I would like to thank B. Moldovanu and W. Leininger for valuable discussions. In particular, I am indebted to U. Kamecke for helpful comments. Support from the Sonderforschungsbereich 303 is gratefully acknowledged.
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Funk, P. Auctions with interdependent valuations. Int J Game Theory 25, 51–64 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01254384
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01254384