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Structure of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules with quasi-transitive individual preferences

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Abstract

The paper investigates the structure of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules with unrestricted domain under the assumption that individual weak preference relations are reflexive, connected, and quasi-transitive. Among other results, neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules on this domain are characterized for alternative social rationality assumptions.

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  1. Satish K. Jain

    Present address: Centre for Economic Studies and Planing, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, 110067, New Delhi, India

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    1. Satish K. Jain
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    Jain, S.K. Structure of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules with quasi-transitive individual preferences. Zeitschr. f. Nationalökonomie 64, 195–212 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01250115

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    • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01250115

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