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Necessary and sufficient conditions forl-stability of games in constitutional form

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Abstract

This paper is devoted to the notion of game in constitutional form. For this game, we define three notions of cores: theo-core, thei-core and thej-core. For each core, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for a game to be stable. We finally prove that these theorems generalize Nakamura's theorems for stability of a simple game and Keiding's theorems for stability of an effectivity function.

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References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Ecole Normale Supérieure, BP. 47, Yaounde, Cameroun

    N. G. Andjiga & J. Moulen

Authors
  1. N. G. Andjiga
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  2. J. Moulen
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Andjiga, N.G., Moulen, J. Necessary and sufficient conditions forl-stability of games in constitutional form. Int J Game Theory 18, 91–110 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01248497

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01248497

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