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Credibility and time consistency in a stochastic world

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This paper was written while the first author was an Houblon-Norman Research Fellow at the Bank of England; this financial support, together with that of the Rockefeller Foundation, is gratefully acknowledged.

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Currie, D., Levine, P. Credibility and time consistency in a stochastic world. Zeitschr. f. Nationalökonomie 47, 225–252 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01245146

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